Citigroup Defrauding It’s Mortgage Clients?

I find it troubling that regulators seek to bury wholesale origination (brokers) in new regulation while retail origination is being painted as the good guy in the mortgage meltdown. The only difference between wholesale origination and retail origination is the lobbying power of the latter dwarfs that of the former.

Regulators, through their proposed legislation and regulatory changes, would have you believe that fraud only exists in the wholesale origination end of the business. Nothing could be further from the truth. Retail lenders are equally prone to fraudulent lending activities as are the wholesale originators. Apparently, the regulators haven’t recognized this.

In the current environment of massive lending changes and industry scrutiny, fraudulent origination practices have been uncovered at Citigroup. Essentially they have been misrepresenting, to their adjustable rate mortgage clients, that their rate resets will be higher than their present mortgage rates, therefore they should refinance to a fixed rate mortgage.

This would be beneficial to their clients if in fact the resets were higher than current rates. However, they are not higher and in fact are lower. Consider this post at Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis. Emphasis is mine.

Question 1. What happens to our loan on the anniversary? Will it go down?
Answer: It is very unlikely that it will go down. Would you like to refinance?

By the way the existing rate on the loan in the Email above is 6.00%. That rate is based on the one-year treasury rate plus an index of 2.75. On March 17, the one-year T-Bill rate was 1.53 as quoted during the conference call. Let’s do the math. 1.53 + 2.75 = 4.28 (rounded to the nearest higher 1/8 would be 4.375). Citigroup told the client the new rate would be above 6.00%

The above conversation, in conjunction with the documented hard evidence above, suggests a pattern deceit by Citigroup. I am wondering how many Citigroup customers have refinanced to a higher rate and payment based on inaccurate rate quotes from Citigroup mortgage specialists.

I am not a lawyer. I do not know if any of this violates truth in lending laws, fair lending practices laws, or any other laws. However, I do know this is a mess, and if I was a customer of Citigroup I would be questioning whether or not I could believe anything they say.

In the sake of fairness, if Citigroup has a different explanation for the above examples, I will post it.

Interestingly, nothing new from Citigroup has been posted on the site. Also here is another snippet from a lawyer who responded to the post.

I received an Email from a lawyer who writes:

I am a lawyer. And, you don’t need to be a lawyer to KNOW fraud when you see it, and I’d say that what you describe – deliberately misquoting rates, etc. is fraud (there are two types of fraud – fraud in fact and fraud in the inducement, but we don’t have to get in to that, and you may well know the difference (and I suspect you do)).

Most law is “common sense” and if something screams “fraud” it most likely is – under whatever particular law – whether statutory law or common law.

If Citi KNOWS the rate is going lower, but says “it is most likely to go higher” and doesn’t give a straight answer, and is stupid enough to have third party witnesses listen to the misrepresentations and/or put them in writing and or have them recorded (and I assume Citi records a lot of stuff by law or company policy), then they deserve to be sued by a lot people.

I encourage you to visit the post on Mish’s blog as it is well documented and easy to understand. There is no question that Citi’s activity is fraudulent in my opinion. I would fire any loan officer in my employ for doing anything that resembled this practice. Institutionalized mortgage fraud, you have got to love it.

I can identify a significant number of retail originators whose ethics are far from above questioning. The above example is not unique even though the regulators would like you to believe so.

When new regulations emerge from this lending crisis, they should be applied fairly to ALL originators and not just wholesale origination. The act of over regulating one type of originator over another stinks of cronyism and unfairness. More importantly, applying regulation on a favoritism basis does little if anything in providing more protections for the consumer.

The regulators aren’t doing the right things, they are just doing things. It makes them look like they are doing something constructive but that clearly is not the case.

The Current State of Mortgage Originators

Here is a video of the current state of mortgage originators around the nation.

Enjoy…

glumbert - Bad Day at the Office

Finally! The REAL Criminals are Being Targeted

For months the Mortgage Guy has been fighting the flawed perception that those most culpable for the mortgage meltdown are the buyers, realtors and mortgage originators. Conventional wisdom would have you believe they are most and directly responsible for the real estate meltdown and the mortgage crisis.

My contention is that the home buyers, real estate agents and mortgage originators are being wrongly blamed for the mortgage meltdown. Sure they played a part, but I believe their respective responsibilities for the debacle is minimal and leaning toward innocence in nature and intent.

All political and regulatory emphasis to date, has been put on either adding to already burdensome lending regulations or bailing out the “greedy” home buyer. That is until the Securities and Exchange Commission set their sights on the mortgage securitization process. This is where the biggest, most serious and harmful crimes were committed.

A look at this recent Yahoo News article will give you an idea as to what the SEC is concerned with.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating how banks, credit rating firms and lenders valued and disclosed complex mortgage-backed securities that ultimately led to the subprime crisis, a top agency enforcer said on Saturday.

The article points out that while the SEC didn’t name the companies involved, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley have disclosed regulatory investigations pertaining to their role in the credit crisis. In all, there are over thirty firms being looked at. It goes on to say…

Banks, due diligence firms and credit rating agencies are being examined for their role in the securitization process, or how mortgages were sold, repackaged and bundled into special financial products.

The SEC is looking at the valuations and accounting treatments of mortgage-backed securities. It is looking at whether the securities were valued correctly in the first place, what was the level of risk and if that was adequately disclosed to shareholders.

In my opinion, the investment banks, with help from others, committed the fraud of labeling credit standard deficient loans as AAA investment grade paper. By doing so, they were able to feed a huge hunger for safe but uncharacteristically high yielding investments. Feeding this appetite for high yet safe yield, allowed for the spread of this toxic paper all over the world.

The investment banks could not pull off the crime of the century without having ample assistance. This is where the ratings agencies and due diligence firms/departments come into play.

It is up to due diligence entities to properly assess the risk and suitability of investments. Apparently, based on the total destruction of our credit markets, these due diligence “experts” couldn’t see that by mixing a pot of AAA mortgages with a pot of DDD mortgages one cannot expect an investment pool deserving a AAA rating as the end result. This is so even if you take into consideration that they bought “insurance” on the portfolio.

The final gate keeper responsible for safeguarding the investment public from misdeeds such as these, are the credit rating agencies. These so called “independent” firms really have the final say as to the grade of any debt security. Yet they also couldn’t see that an investment portfolio with a major exposure to credit standard deficient mortgages should not be rated AAA in safety.

A reasonable person would wonder why the ratings agencies would implicate themselves in what turns out to be the total destruction of our debt markets. The answer is the same for all involved. Money.

At S&P, for instance, no longer will they hand out triple-A’s to issuers who pay them boatloads of fees. They now will employ an ombudsman to listen to complaints about the agencies handing out triple-A’s to issuers who pay them boatloads of fees.

What if General Motors built cars that didn’t run, or your local dairy produced sour milk? What if your bank said it didn’t deposit your paycheck because it lost it, or the electric company just quit supplying your neighborhood?

Then, in response to it all, those companies said: good news, we’re hiring an ombudsman. The ratings agencies in the same fashion have failed on their intrinsic purpose: to judge the likelihood that a debt will default. As of Tuesday they’re about 0 for a few billion.

The quote is from an excellent MarketWatch article that gives insight into the role the ratings agencies played in the destruction of our credit markets. I owe a huge hat tip to The Common Sense Forecaster for bringing my attention to it.

It’s important to realize that events leading to the mortgage meltdown occurred on a “top down” basis. Buyers cannot buy from realtors unless mortgage originators have the loan programs to fit the buyer’s profile. The mortgage originators cannot offer loan programs unless lenders are providing them. The lenders will not provide loan programs unless the securitizers can turn the mortgages into marketable securities and the ratings agencies have the final say as to the grade (the likelihood of default) of those securities.

Proof for this observation is the current state of the mortgage industry. Despite the current demand, no longer are 100% financing for credit damaged borrowers and stated income and asset programs available. This is because lenders cannot securitize these types of loans. They cannot securitize these loans because it has become painfully apparent to investors that these once called AAA investments are nothing of the sort.

Also evidenced by the current state of the mortgage industry, is that without the securitization of mortgages, no one lends and thus, no one buys real estate or borrows money against their house. This makes it clear that it is the securitization engine that drives the entire mortgage process and in turn the real estate markets.

The demand still exists for 100% financing, no income, no asset loans and subprime/alt A loans in general. Being that these programs are no longer available, makes clear that the mortgage business is not driven from the bottom up. The demand is still there, yet it goes unanswered because the securitizers cannot sell the mortgage backed securities. The business is indeed driven by top down forces.

Realizing that the mortgage industry runs on securitization, it’s plain to see who the real criminals are in the mortgage crisis. It is clearly the securitizers, due diligence firms and ratings agencies. They are the major force behind the mortgage industry and it’s destruction.

Without the securitizers lying about the credit quality of the subprime mortgages being securitized, and the winks and the nods from the due diligence firms and ratings agencies, the securitizers could have never sold anywhere near the amount of toxic debt that has been polluting investment portfolios and economies around the world.

The fraud committed by these criminals created the immense capital that led buyers and originators to use the unsuitable mortgage products that have led us into this world wide crisis. They enabled the lenders, originators, realtors and buyers in committing their misdeeds which have led to the total seizing of our credit markets. This in turn has thrust our economy into recession and potentially much worse.

Now it should be clear to all, the buyer, realtor and originators were simply responding to demand that was met by capital that was fraudulently raised. All the buyers wanted was a piece of the “American Dream”. Realtors sought to help them get it and the originators were empowered to provide the financing by the capital raised through fraudulent means.

These subprime/alt A, toxic loan programs simply appeared on our rate sheets. The guidelines specifically allowed for damaged credit, no down payments, no proof of income, assets and in some cases no proof of having a job. There was no fraud involved because the product guidelines allowed for these aspects specifically.

Originators who realized these types of loans were time bombs waiting to explode, could not refuse to sell them. If they did, the consumer would just go to another originator offering these programs. Believe me, there were many originators who saw the writing on the wall two to three years ago. Yet we were powerless to do anything about it. It wasn’t our money being lent, thus we had no say and market forces worked against dissent.

It’s time to end the mis-perception that it was the greed of buyers, realtors and originators that led us into the subprime/credit crisis. Yes to a degree this element played a part in the dilemma but this is not the real cause of the meltdown. It was the titanic greed of the securitizers and their “assistants” that fraudulently created the capital and market forces that have led us to the historic break down of our credit markets and economy.

The first step in restoring confidence in the debt markets shouldn’t be bailouts for the investment banks and insurers. Nor should it be bailing out homeowners through rendering legal contracts as useless. The healing will begin when the real criminals are outed and the perp walks proceed down Wall Street.

Then the world will know our markets are governed by the rule of law, one set of laws for all and no one above the law, as opposed to political cronyism. The perception of political and regulatory cronyism will undoubtedly taint our securities markets forever. This will further weaken the United States’ ability to be a world class economic player.

Mortgage Lender or Mortgage Broker An Easy Decision

The non-choice between mortgage lender and mortgage broker.You may have heard the commercials “we’re the lender, we write the checks”. Lenders like to make a big deal out of the fact that they are lenders and not brokers. Why? I don’t know, as it makes little or no difference from the borrower’s perspective.

Both can rip you off and both can give you the best interest rate and closing costs. Both can make the financing experience fruitful and pleasant or resemble a root canal. Neither has a distinct advantage in providing a loan for you. How do I know? My company is licensed as both a broker and a lender.

So what are the differences between lenders and brokers?

Technically a broker doesn’t lend the borrower the money. Only a lender can make a loan. They do so through brokers or direct borrower solicitation. A loan never closes in the broker’s name. The broker will not be mentioned on the mortgage note and mortgage or first trust deed. The lender executes those documents. The primary difference between broker and lender is whose name the loan closes in.

This is why brokers cannot issue a commitment letter. They are not lending the money, therefore they cannot commit to making a loan. A broker can however, obtain a commitment letter from a lender and pass it on to the borrower.

The same holds true for interest rate locks. A broker cannot issue a rate lock, not verbally or in writing. The money lent doesn’t belong to the broker, they cannot rate lock someone else’s money. The proper way to handle a rate lock is for the broker to request a rate lock from the wholesale lender and pass it on to the borrower.

Tip:

Broker issued, as opposed to lender issued, commitment letters and rate locks have no value at all. If you ever receive a commitment letter or interest rate lock issued by a mortgage broker, you probably don,t want to do business with that company.

The company is breaking the law. Consider reporting them to the appropriate regulatory bodies. In Connecticut, that would the Banking Department. A report can also be filed on the federal level by contacting the Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD.

I cannot tell you how many times clients, potential clients and wholesale reps have told me about brokers issuing commitment letters and/or rate locks. As a consumer, you want both in writing. You have nothing unless it is in writing.

Underwriting the Loan

When it comes to underwriting (validating the borrower’s loan file) there are no discernible differences between mortgage broker and lender. If we are brokering a loan we underwrite according to the lender’s guidelines. If we close the loan in our name and act as a lender, the same guidelines apply. Even the largest of lenders have to answer to underwriting guidelines. The only difference is who dictates the guidelines.

The lender makes the rules for the broker and the investors make the rules for the lender. Lenders can sell loans to other lenders for subsequent resale or they can sell the loans directly to investors, either one at a time or in “bulk”. Brokers only “sell” their loans to lenders and one at a time. The consumer gains no advantage dealing with a broker or a lender in the context of underwriting the loan.

Loan Pricing

Whether a loan is brokered or a loan is made, the product is the same as is the pricing (interest rate). Selling loans in bulk can garner a pricing advantage for the lender but that advantage is rarely passed on to the borrower. The consumer doesn’t gain a pricing advantage dealing with either entity.

Consumer Disclosure

Disclosure requirements differ among lender and broker. Lenders are required to make certain written disclosures to borrowers that brokers are not required to make. The same is true for brokers. Again, from the consumer’s perspective, there is no advantage here for the broker or lender. The borrower will still sign a bunch of forms and be afforded certain consumer protections.

Yield Spread Premium

There is a distinct difference in disclosure requirements when it comes to yield spread premium. Yield spread premium is much like selling a bond at a premium. Both mortgages and bonds generate revenue by being sold at a rate higher than the “going” or par rate at the time of the sale. This is how no point loans and no cost loans are offered.

Instead of requiring the borrower to pay points for loan at a given interest rate, for accepting a higher interest rate, the borrower can have the fees covered by yield spread premium. Brokers must disclose this premium to the borrower. Lenders do not have to disclose their premium to the borrower.

I bring this up because there has been a lot press about yield spread premium. Certain politicians who are attempting to demonize brokers and the lending industry, are labeling this premium as a kick-back. Nothing can be further from the truth. Premium is a natural occurrence in the debt markets. If it’s a kick back to brokers, it’s a kick back for lenders and investors as well.

However, it’s not a kick-back.

kick-back: noun

  1. a percentage of income given to a person in a position of power or influence as payment for having made the income possible: usually considered improper or unethical.
  2. a rebate, usually given secretively by a seller to a buyer or to one who influenced the buyer.
  3. the practice of an employer or a person in a supervisory position of taking back a portion of the wages due workers.

from dictionary dot com.

It’s capital gain on the instrument being sold, a profit if you will. Premium is an integral part of pricing debt obligations. Furthermore, in the case of the broker, it is fully disclosed on the settlement statement. A kick back is done without the knowledge of the consumer.

As with the other aspects of securing a mortage, there is no advantage going to the broker or lender.

Summary

In obtaining a mortgage, there is little or no difference working with a broker or lender considering the mechanics of the transaction, loan underwriting, pricing, product design, regulatory protections and yield spread premium.

Both can be upstanding and competent entities to work with or inept ripoffs. From the borrower’s point of view, what else is there? There is no consumer advantage to working with either a lender or a broker. Keep the focus on choosing the right product at a good price from people with a track record of competency and trustworthiness.